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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Two linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail 
Bonds (hereinafter "Two Jinn" or "Aladdin"), appeals from the district court's memorandum 
opinion and order issued in connection with Two Jinn's petition for judicial review of the Idaho 
Department oflnsurance's (hereinafter "DOl") Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on 
Request for Declaratory Ruling ("Final Order"). This Court should reverse the Final Order 
because the DO I erroneously declared that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes bail agents and their 
surety from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction which permits 
recovery of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as 
required in court. 
B. Procedural and Factual History 
Aladdin is licensed by the State of Idaho as a producer of bail surety insurance and 
Danielson National Insurance Company (hereinafter "Danielson") is authorized by the State of 
Idaho in surety insurance. Agency Record (hereinafter A.R.) 111. I Aladdin utilizes bail bonds 
issued by Danielson in connection with its pretrial release services and to that end, uses a form 
entitled "Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond." Jd. The Third Paragraph of this 
Indemnity Agreement requires the contracting parties: 
THIRD: To reimburse [Aladdin] and Surety for actual expenses incurred and 
caused by a breach by the Principal of the terms for which thc Application and 
Bail Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of 
searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody, incurred by [Aladdin] 
IThe parties stipulated to these facts in the proceedings before the DOL Tr. (3-8-2010) 
pp. 6-7; also A.R. 69-71,110-111. 
or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or endeavoring to apprehend Principal, 
including legal fees incurred by [Aladdin] or Surety in making application to a 
court for an order to vacate or to set aside the order of forfeiture or Judgment 
entered thereon. However, no expenses or liabilities incurred for recapturing or 
returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after the entry of Judgment. 
A.R. 12, 111 (hereinafter "Third Paragraph" or "Paragraph Three"). 
This paragraph has significance when a criminal defendant released on bail breaches the 
bail bond agreement by failing to appear for court as ordered and the court orders the bail bond 
forfeited. In such situations, the surety insurance company or its bail agent may exercise its 
authority pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-29142 and arrest the criminal defendant. If such a 
defendant appears before the court within 180 days following the order forfeiting the bail, the 
court will exonerate the bail pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2922(5). The Third Paragraph of the 
Indemnity Agreement allows Aladdin and Danielson to recover costs they expend in 
apprehending and returning a criminal defendant to custody in order to have the forfeiture set 
aside and the bond exonerated. 
In 2004, Two linn and DOl representatives discussed the position of a DOl representative 
that Idaho Code § 41-1042, which addresses the collections and charges a bail agent may assess 
for his or her services in the bail transaction, precludes Aladdin from entering indemnity 
agreements such as Paragraph Three. Clerk's Record ("C.R.") 12. Aladdin notified the DOl via 
letter of its position that Section 41-1042 does not limit the remedies available upon breach of 
the bail bond agreement and that Aladdin was entitled to continue collecting reasonable 
apprehension costs. Id. The DOl did not substantively respond to this letter. Id. 
2 Pursuant to Section 19-2914, the surety insurance company or its bail agent "may 
empower any person of suitable age and discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the 
state" at any time before the exoneration of bail. 
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In January 2009, a DOL representative sent a letter to Danielson and instructed it to amend 
the Indemnity Agreement to eliminate the provision regarding collection of apprehensions costs. 
Jd. at 12-13. This letter prompted a renewed good faith discussion between Aladdin and the DOL 
regarding Section 41-1042's applicability to apprehension costs. Id. Following the parties' 
continued disagreement, they discussed that Aladdin would seek a declaratory ruling on Section 
41-1042' s scope from which Aladdin would thereafter seek judicial review, if necessary. Id. 
In December 2009, Two Jinn asked the DOL to declare that Idaho Code § 41-1042 does 
not preclude a bail agent or its surety from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the 
bail transaction such as that set forth in Paragraph Three, which permit recovery of apprehension 
expenses. A.R. 1-10. In a preliminary order, a hearing officer concluded that Idaho Code § 41-
1042 precludes agreements providing for reimbursement of apprehension and surrender costs. 
A.R. 69- 77. After further argument and briefing, the DOl Director issued his Final Order, which 
concluded that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes bail agents and sureties from entering into 
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs contemporaneous with the 
bail transaction. A.R. 109-122. 
Aladdin timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the district court and a motion to 
stay the Final Order. C.R.4-9. The district court stayed enforcement of the Final Order pending 
resolution of Aladdin's petition for judicial review but ultimately affirmed the DOl's Final Order. 
C.R. 55-56, 122-129. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Should this Court reverse the Final Order because the DOl's declaration that Idaho Code § 
41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail 
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transaction which permits collection of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal 
defendant fail to appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices Aladdin's substantial rights? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the DOl's decision independently of the district court. Vickers v. 
Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 666, 669 (2011); Kuna Boxing Club, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery 
Com'n, 149 Idaho 94,97,233 P.3d 25,28 (2009). A reviewing court may overturn an agency 
decision ifit was: "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the 
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The judiciary is free to correct errors of law in an agency's decision. Mercy Medical 
Center v. Ada County, Bd. of, 146 Idaho 226, 229,192 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2008); Love v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 559, 671 P.2d 471, 472 (1983); see also 
Vickers, 150 Idaho at 442,247 P.3d at 669 (Supreme Court freely reviews questions of law). 
Because the DOl is entrusted to administer the Insurance Code which includes Idaho Code § 41-
1042, this Court "may defer" to the DOl's statutory interpretation so long as that interpretation is 
reasonable and not contrary to the statute's express language. See Kuna Boxing Club, Inc., 149 
Idaho at 97,233 P.3d at 28. Nevertheless, "'the ultimate responsibility to construe legislative 
language to determine the law' rests with the judiciary, and the underlying consideration whether 
to grant such deference is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent." Kuna Boxing Club, 
Inc., 149 Idaho at 97, 233 P.3d at 28, citing Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583, 21 P.3d 
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903, 905 (2001) and Simplot v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 
1210-11 (1991). "An agency construction will not be followed ifit contradicts the clear 
expressions ofthe legislature because 'the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. '" Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1211, 
citing Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
In interpreting a statute, the court first looks to the statute as written and determines 
whether the language is clear and unambiguous. In re Daniel W, 145 Idaho 677, 680,183 P.3d 
765, 768 (2008); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65,67 (Ct. App. 2000). Ifit is, the 
language of the statute is given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. In re Daniel W, 145 
Idaho at 680, 183 P.3d at 768; State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). 
The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless the clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 
427,80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). If the language is ambiguous, courts must ascertain the 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 
688 (1999); State v. A1adden, 147 Idaho 886, 888, 216 P.3d 644,646 (Ct. App. 2009). The 
standard rules of statutory construction require deriving legislative intent by looking to the literal 
words of the statute, the content of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its 
legislative history. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462,988 P.2d at 688. 
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B. Idaho Code § 41-1042 Does Not Limit a Bail Agent's Ability to Recover 
Apprehension Costs Pursuant to an Indemnity Agreement Entered During 
the Bail Transaction 
By its plain terms, Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not apply to the remedies available to the 
parties in the event of a breach of the bail bond agreement and, rather, addresses charges that may 
be assessed for the bail agent's services during the bail transaction. Further, the DOl's 
interpretation of Section 41-1042 is illogical and internally inconsistent in that it permits bail 
agents to contract for one remedy in the event of breach - the agreement to pay the forfeiture - but 
not contract for another remedy in the event of breach the agreement to pay apprehension costs, 
when neither remedy is enumerated in Section 41-1042. Finally, even if the statutory language 
were ambiguous, legislative history and public policy confirm a legislative intent to allow bail 
agents to contract for the recovery of contingent losses, including apprehension expenses, at the 
time of the bail transaction. Accordingly, the DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is 
unreasonable and erroneous and this Court should reverse the Final Order. 
1. Idaho Code § 41-1042's plain language does not preclude recovery of the 
breach remedy reflected in Aladdin's indemnity agreement 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 provides: 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent in any 
bail transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or 
other valuable consideration from any person except for the following: 
(a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer; 
(b) To provide collateral; 
(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in 
connection with the bail transaction, limited to the following: 
(i) Expenditures actually and reasonably incurrcd to verifY 
underwriting information or to pay for notary public fees; 
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provided however, that the total of all such expenditures 
reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and 
(ii) Travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) 
miles from a bail agent's place of business, which includes 
any city or locality in which the bail agent advertises or 
engages in bail business, up to the amount allowed by the 
internal revenue service for business travel for the year in 
which the travel occurs. 
(2) Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any 
charge for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully 
document all expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement. 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, Section 41-1042 limits the reimbursement a bail agent may seek for his or her 
services and expenses in connection with the bail transaction. The Third Paragraph of the 
Indemnity Agreement does not describe charges for such services and expenses and, instead, 
obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to 
reimburse expenses that might be incurred at a later date in the event the criminal defendant 
breaches the bail bond agreement by failing to appear in court as ordered and it becomes necessary 
to apprehend and return the defendant to custody. Section 41-1042 has no application to this 
agreement to pay contingent recovery expenses. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the statute's express provision permitting bail agents to 
collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which necessarily contemplates that the paliies may enter 
contracts describing remedies in the event of a breach of the bail bond agreement. Further, the 
DOl acknowledges that Section 41-1042 does not preclude bail agents from obtaining the 
defendant and third party indemnitor's agreement to reimburse the bail agent and surety for the 
face amount of the bail bond in the event of forfeiture. It is illogical and inconsistent to conclude 
7 
the statute's plain terms do not apply to one unenumerated breach remedy the agreement to 
reimbursement the bail agent for the forfeiture - yet preclude a different unenumerated breach 
remedy reimbursement for apprehension expenses. Rather, Section 41-1042 applies to neither 
remedy since neither is a charge for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. 
a. the Third Paragraph does not describe charges for the bail agent's service 
in the bail transaction 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits a bail agent from "charg[ing] or collect[ing] money or 
other valuable consideration" in any bail transaction except to pay premiums, to provide collateral 
and to reimburse for certain enumerated expenses incurred during the underwriting process. This 
section only implicates charges for the bail agent's "service in a bail transaction." See Idaho Code 
§ 41-1042(2) ("a bail agent shall not make any charge for his service in a bail transaction" except 
as permitted under this section). 
A bail agent's service in connection with the bail transaction includes tasks such as 
gathering information concerning a criminal defendant's background, ties to the community, 
family ties, criminal history, credit history, the financial wherewithal of all those involved as well 
as other relevant factors in evaluating the risk posed by executing a particular bond. The bail 
agent then negotiates the terms under which Aladdin is willing to execute the bail bond, including 
the possibility of requiring the defendant's participation in a supervised bail program, the 
provision of a third-party indemnitor or collateral to secure the bond. The agreement to pay 
apprehension costs in the event of a breach by the principal as provided in the Third Paragraph 
does not describe charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. Rather, the 
contingent costs described in this paragraph concern the remedy available to Aladdin and its 
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surety following the bail transaction which is implicated only in those situations where the 
principal breaches his obligations. 
As noted by the district court, "the applicable portion of the statute concerns bail agent 
reimbursement for charges actually incurred" for the bail agent's services in the bail transaction. 
c.R. 129. These enumerated expenses include those incurred to verify underwriting information 
or to pay for notary public fees and travel expenses. Idaho Code § 41-1 042(1)(c). Unlike the 
reimbursement for contingent apprehension expenses set forth in Paragraph Three, those 
enumerated expenses illustrate the types of charges incurred in connection with the bail agent's 
service in the bail transaction and relate to the bail agent's service in executing the bail bond. 
In its memorandum opinion and order, the district court mischaracterized Aladdin's 
argument as being that the terms of the statute only apply to "bail transactions" and "that seeking 
recovery of expenses incurred pursuant to a bail contract's terms is not a bail transaction." C.R. 
128. Aladdin instead argues that the statute only limits charges for the bail agent's service in a 
bail transaction and that an agreement describing the parties' remedies in the event of breach does 
not constitute charges for such services. That the parties execute the indemnity agreement as part 
of the bail transaction does not convert the contingent reimbursement set forth therein to 
"charge[ s] for the [bail agent's] service in a bail transaction" within the scope of Section 41-1042. 
The district court further found that "the indemnity agreement is a part of the overall bail 
transaction, for which Two linn is receiving a fee and collecting a charge" and that the "collection 
of costs of apprehension is [ arguably] a 'charge. '" C. R. 129. Bail agents do not endeavor to 
recover fugitives who have breached the bail bond agreement as a "service" in the bail transaction. 
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Regardless of the timing, the reimbursement set forth in the agreement concerns contingent 
expenses unrelated to charges incurred during the bail transaction. 
Section 41- 1042 clearly and unambiguously applies to charges assessed for the bail agent's 
services in connection with a bail transaction, i.e., issuing and posting a bail bond. The Third 
Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement does not set forth charges assessed in connection with the 
bail agent's service in the bail transaction and, instead, provides for reimbursement of expenses in 
the event the defendant breaches his obligations and fails to appear in court. Thus, the plain 
language of Section 41-1042 does not preclude Aladdin from entering indemnity agreements such 
as that set forth in this paragraph at the time of the bail transaction. 
b. the Third Paragraph does not constitute "valuable consideration" prohibited 
by the statute 
According to the DOl, "because Aladdin requires the Indemnity Agreement in order to 
obtain bail and because it consists of a promise to pay, it violates Idaho Code § 41-1042 because it 
constitutes a prohibited 'charge' or at least a 'valuable consideration' not among those expressly 
permitted." A.R. 113-114 (Final Order, pp. 5-6); see also C.R. 128-29 (noting Aladdin will not 
conclude the bail transaction without the bail contract). This argument is unavailing. 
The Final Order acknowledges that a bail agent may require the defendant to agree to a 
number of terms as part of the bail contract, including contracting with the defendant and a third 
party indemnitor to be liable for the face amount of the bail bond in the event of breach. See A.R. 
119 (positing hypothetical where the "indemnitor wants to limit his losses to being liable for the 
face amount of the bond as previously promised but does not want to also be responsible for 
attempted recovery costs." (emphasis added». This prior promise, of course, is obtained at the 
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time of the bail transaction. However, the DOl does not assert the promise to pay the forfeited 
amount of the bond in the event of breach constitutes "valuable consideration" prohibited by the 
statute despite the fact that this promise is not enumerated as a permissible charge in Section 41-
1042. 
The DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is internally inconsistent as neither the 
promise to pay the bail bond in the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs is 
enumerated in Section 41-1042 as an allowable charge. A promise to pay apprehension costs in 
the event of a breach cannot constitute "valuable consideration" prohibited by the statute if a 
promise to pay the face amount of the bond in the event of breach does not. Instead, Section 41-
1042 has no application to either remedy because neither represents a charge for the bail agent's 
service during the bail transaction. Accordingly, the DOl's interpretation is unreasonable and 
contrary to the statute's plain language. 
Further, it could be argued that innumerable matters associated with the Indemnity 
Agreement utilized by Aladdin or other bail agents constitute "valuable consideration" not set 
forth in Section 41-1042. For instance, bail agents require the principal to promise to appear in 
court as ordered, may require a third-party relative to sign an indemnity agreement in addition to 
the principal or may require the principal to agree to supervised bail where he or she is required to 
check in with the bail agent at specified times to ensure the principal is meeting his or her 
obligations. See A.R. 111-112 (Final Order, pp. 3-4) ("[I]t is not uncommon for a bail agent and 
surety to require additional conditions beyond the fundamental requirement to appear at all 
required court hearings as part of the issuance of the bail bond. Additional requirements can 
include requiring the principal to periodically check in with the bail agents."). The DOl does not 
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dispute the appropriateness of a bail agent requiring such consideration as a condition of the bail 
bond even though none of the foregoing are specifically enumerated in the statute. 3 
Nor should the DOL assert otherwise. None of the fc)[egoing, including a promise to pay 
the forfeited amount of the bond, constitute a "charge" or attempt to "collect money or other 
valuable consideration" for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. 
2. Section 41-1042's collateral provision further demonstrates that the DOl's 
interpretation of this statute is unreasonable 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 permits bail agents to "collect money or other valuable 
consideration" to "provide collateral." Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b). Title 41 defines "collateral" 
as "property of any kind given as security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(2). This 
collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. Idaho Code § 41-1043. 
Thus, rather than precluding a bail agent from contracting for remedies in the event of a breach of 
the criminal defendant's obligations under the bail bond, Section 41-1042 expressly contemplates 
the existence of such remedies by permitting bail agents to take collateral from the consumer to 
protect against contingent losses. 
a. the propriety of indemnity agreements must be recognized to give effect to 
Section 41-1042' s collateral provision 
A statute must not be construed in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions 
included therein. Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571-72,798 P.2d 27,30-31 (1990). If 
indemnity agreements were barred by Section 41-1042 and bail agents were precluded from 
3 Indeed, counsel for the DOL staff agreed that many of the provisions contained in 
Aladdin's Indemnity Agreement are acceptable including requiring the criminal defendant to 
provide a third-party indemnitor who agrees to pay the bail bond in the event the defendant fails 
to appear and requiring the defendant to agree to appear for all court appearances and to 
periodically check in with the bail agent. Tr. (March 8, 2(10) p. 18, In. 9-22; p. 20, In. 22-24. 
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requiring a criminal defendant or others to be responsible for expenses in the event of the bail's 
forfeiture, there would be no need for collateral. The 001' s interpretation of Section 41 1042 as 
precluding bail agents from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the bail transaction 
renders those sections governing bail agents' acceptance of collateral during the bail transaction 
mere surplusage. 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not limit the remedies available in the event of a breach of the 
bail bond nor does it limit the losses to which collateral may be applied in the event of a breach.4 
While the collateral must not be excessive in relation to the bond amount and there are 
requirements regarding how it is handled,5 there is no limitation placed on a bail agent's ability to 
apply this collateral towards a duly contracted for loss such as a forfeited bail bond or the costs of 
apprehending a criminal defendant in order to prevent the forfeiture. 
The 001 has consistently acknowledged that the collateral which a bail agent is permitted 
to collect under Section 41-1042(1)(b) may be applied towards the amount of the forfeited bail 
bond. See A.R. 116; Tr. (July 21,2010) p. 15, In. 7 - p. 16, In. 8. The DOl's position is illogical 
as Section 41-1042 does not expressly reference requiring the parties to be liable for the bail bond 
as an allowable "charge." Section 41-1042 cannot be read to permit bail agents to contract for 
payment of the entire bail bond but to prohibit agents from contracting for reimbursement of 
apprehension expenses incurred in order to avoid payment of the entire bail bond. 
4 Paragraph Eight of the Indemnity Agreement utilized by Aladdin provides that any 
collateral collected may be applied to the obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and 
expenses specified in the Agreement. A.R. 12. 
5For example, collateral must be deposited and maintained in a separate trust account if 
collateral is received in the form of cash or in a separate and secure location apart from the bail 
agent's assets if not in cash. See Idaho Code §§ 41-1043(1) and (2) 
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b. indemnity agreements are given to secure the bail bond and guarantee the 
promise to appear in court and thus more closely resemble a form of 
"collateral" than valuable consideration for the bail agent's services 
To the extent that the contingent agreement described in the Third Paragraph is "valuable 
consideration" charged in a bail transaction, it must be construed as a form of collateral expressly 
permitted by Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b). The district court found, however, that this argument 
"distorts the traditional and accepted meaning of" the term "collateral." C.R. 129. Even if the 
Indemnity Agreement is not the type of property that is normally contemplated as collateral, it is 
given to secure the bail bond and, thus, more closely resembles a form of collateral than a charge 
for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090 (7th 
ed. 2000) (defining "collateral security" as "a security, subordinate to and given in addition to a 
primary security, that is intended to guarantee the validity or convertibility of the primary 
security"). A defendant or third party's agreement to pay expenses in the event of forfeiture of the 
bond - the agreement to reimburse the bail agent for apprehension expenses or the forfeiture itself 
should those efforts fail - is given as security to obtain a bail bond and to guarantee the validity of 
the principal's promise to appear as ordered by the court. 
Thus, if the Third Paragraph is "valuable consideration" charged in a bail transaction, it 
falls squarely within the definition of collateral and is permissible pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-
1042(1)(b). In order to reconcile the DOl's contention that indemnity agreements such as the 
Third Paragraph are "valuable consideration" charged for the bail agent's service in a bail 
transaction with Section 41-1042' s express recognition of indemnity agreements by providing for 
collateral to secure the bail bond, such agreements themselves must be considered as a form of 
collateral. 
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If bail agents were not permitted to enter contracts during the bail transaction that 
described the remedies available in the event the bail bond is breached, there would be no reason 
to permit bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond. Section 41-1042 expressly 
contemplates that parties will enter agreements regarding the remedies available in the event the 
bail bond is breached. 
3. The Idaho Legislature would not have adopted a statute that thwarted the 
purpose of bail and created grave public safety issues 
The public policy underlying bail bonds and encouraging the return of fugitives to custody, 
existing Idaho case law, the legislative history of Idaho Code § 41-1042 and authority from other 
jurisdictions throughout the United States all establish that bail agents are entitled to contract for 
the fair and reasonable value of costs incurred in connection with apprehending and surrendering 
a principal to the court's custody. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such costs furthers 
the public policy underlying bail bonds by promoting the defendant's appearance in court and 
promotes public safety. Thus, even if the language of Section 41-1042 is ambiguous as to 
whether it limits remedies pursuant to an indemnity agreement, standard rules of statutory 
construction demonstrate that agreements such as Paragraph Three do not fall within the statute's 
scope. 
a. permitting the recovery of apprehension costs is consistent with the purpose 
of bail and public policy which encourages the return of fugitives to 
custody 
Prohibiting bail agents such as Aladdin from recovering expenses incurred in recapturing 
and surrendering a defendant is contrary to public policy and creates significant public safety 
issues. The primary purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused. State v. Quick 
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Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655,167 P.3d 788,792 (CL App. 2007). Bail agents have the 
authority, and in fact are encouraged, to arrest a defendant who has missed a court appearance and 
return him to court. See Idaho Code § 19-2914 (at any time before the exoneration of bail, the 
surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may empower any person of suitable age and 
discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state"); Idaho Code § 19-2922 ("court 
shall order the bail exonerated: if the "defendant has appeared before the court within one hundred 
eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture"); LC.R. 46(h) (permitting court to set aside 
forfeiture if it appears that justice does not require its enforcement after consideration of several 
factors including "the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending the 
defendant") . 
It is axiomatic that there are costs associated with locating and apprehending absconding 
criminal defendants. Further, it is not disputed that Aladdin can seek reimbursement for the 
amount of a bail bond forfeiture. However, if Aladdin could not recover investigation costs, yet 
could recover the amount of the forfeited bond, it would have no financial incentive to locate and 
return a criminal defendant to court. In such circumstances, the criminal fugitive would remain 
free and public safety would be compromised. Such a result is contrary to the bail bond's purpose 
of ensuring the defendant's appearance in court. 
The purpose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate 
absconders and return them to the court. See County Bonding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131, 
133 (Fla. App. 1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the surety 
has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender ofthe defendant] is 
to create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Board a/Com 'rs of 
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Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) (Liberal interpretation of 
forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides incentives to sureties "to pursue those who flee the 
jurisdiction"). The DOl's construction of Section 41-1042 discourages bail agents from returning 
fugitives and instead encourages them to simply collect the amount of the forfeited bond. The 
legislature would not have enacted a statute that thwarted public policy. 
Further, the criminal defendant and his indemnitor's obligation under the Third Paragraph 
provide an important incentive to the defendant to appear for court. If the criminal defendant 
knows that neither he nor his indemnitors, often family or friends, will be financially responsible 
in the event he absconds, he is more likely to skip bail. Similarly, if the indemnitors are 
financially responsible if the defendant skips bail, they have a financial incentive to assist the 
defendant in making it to court or to assist the bail agents in effectuating the defendant's surrender 
should he fail to do SO.6 
b. the DOl's suggestion that apprehension cost be negotiated after the breach 
has occurred is unrealistic and harmful to both the public and the consumer 
According to the DOl, bail agents should negotiate recovery of apprehension costs after 
the breach has occurred thereby meeting the public's interest in ensuring the presence of the 
accused. A.R. 118-119 (Final Order, p. 10-11) ("By permitting a bail agent to seek to enter into a 
new transaction, albeit related to the bail transaction, for recovery of the principal including the 
reimbursement of recovery and apprehension costs, the goals of encouraging recovery and 
ensuring the presence of the defendant at court hearings are preserved."). The DOl's assertion in 
6 It also must be noted that the expense of apprehending and returning the principal to the 
court is often less than the actual bond amount. In this instance, the indemnitor is better served 
by funding the costs of apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to paying 
the cost of the forfeited bond. 
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this regard is unrealistic and harmful to the public and the consumer. 
In a bail transaction, there is often no third party indemnitor and, thus, it is only the 
criminal defendant who agrees to be responsible for the forfeited bond. Of course, no bail agent is 
going to investigate an absconding defendant's whereabouts for the purpose of negotiating the 
recovery of investigative expenses with that defendant - and no absconding defendant is going to 
agree to reimbursement of expenses already incurred absent a prior agreement. In these scenarios, 
the bail agent will let the forfeiture stand, particularly when there is collateral to secure the bail 
bond or adequate assets against which a judgment can be collected. In those instances, the bail 
agent will have no incentive to return the fugitive to custody and the purpose of bail is thwarted. 
Additionally, the parties should negotiate the liability and breach remedies relating to the 
bail transaction on one occasion, just as with any other transaction. In no forum are breach 
remedies required to be negotiated after the breach has occurred. It would be altogether 
impractical and unproductive for the parties to a car loan, a construction project or any other 
commercial transaction to come together after a breach has occurred and attempt to agree to the 
remedies for that breach. 
Similarly, it is unrealistic to expect that a bail agent and a third party indemnitor will sit 
down at the table again after the breach has occurred and work out the breach remedies including 
the apprehension costs the indemnitor will pay. A bail agent who can simply collect the face 
amount of the bond from that indemnitor is unlikely to undertake the time and expense of 
attempting to negotiate the recovery of apprehension expenses after a defendant has failed to 
appear. Under this scenario, the fugitive remains free to the detriment of the general public as 
well as the consumer/indemnitor who otherwise might have benefitted financially by paying 
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lower apprehension costs rather than the full penal sum of the bond. 
c. the DOl's concern over protecting the bail consumer from unreasonable 
investigation costs is not compelling 
The DOl apparently believes its construction of Section 41-1042 is necessary to protect 
against "unscrupulous and unfair practices of incurring apprehension costs that an indemnitor 
could argue were unnecessary or excessive." A.R. 119 (Final Order, p. 11); see also A.R. 120 
(Final Order, p. 12) ("The fact the charge is latent and conditional does not necessarily assist the 
consumer or relieve the need to protect a consumer. Rather, it is more critical to protect the 
consumer where significant investigative or apprehension fees and expenses may be incurred 
when the consumer is not aware of the likelihood and is focused only on obtaining the defendant's 
release from jail."). This concern is unpersuasive. 
Initially, the record does not reflect any instances where a bail agent has attempted to 
collect unreasonable apprehension fees. Aladdin is already of the view that apprehension costs 
must not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. See, e.g. Idaho Code § 41-1043 
(collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond). In fact, the Final 
Order notes that in the legislative history underlying Section 41-1042, there were very few 
complaints concerning bail bonds and of those complaints, most involved the handling of 
collateral. A.R. 114. If a bail agent did pursue collection of unreasonable apprehension costs, the 
consumer would have a defense to payment of these costs. See, e.g. Saladino v. Stuyvesant Ins. 
Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (holding bail agent was entitled to recover expenses 
incurred in apprehending principal pursuant to indemnity agreement provided such expenses are 
fair and reasonable; $4,000 investigator fee was unreasonable as the principal was residing with 
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his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular employment). 
The DOl agrees that Aladdin can require an indemnitor to post collateral at the time of the 
bail transaction to secure the entire amount of the bail bond. An additional promise - secured or 
unsecured - to reimburse Aladdin for apprehension expenses incurred in returning an absconder 
to court does not expose the defendant or his indemnitor to any additional risk of injury, 
particularly because the total liability must not be excessivc in light of the face amount of the 
bond. Indeed, such agreements protect the consumer and as discussed above serve a compelling 
public interest by providing Aladdin and other bail agents with an incentive to re-capture the 
defendant and obtain exoneration of the bond, rather than simply letting the forfeiture stand and 
collecting the entire amount of the bond from the indemnitor or defendant. Further, an indemnitor 
is better served by funding the costs of apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as 
opposed to paying the higher cost of a forfeited bond. 
The Final Order discusses two circumstances in which an indemnitor may prefer not to 
agree to reimburse apprehension costs notwithstanding these concerns: (1) the indemnitor believes 
that he will have a better chance of convincing the defendant to appear or surrender or (2) the 
indemnitor believes that searching for the defendant would be futile so wants to limit his liability 
to the face amount of the bond. A.R. 119. 
Preliminarily, the overriding consideration should not be an indemnitor's preference to not 
be responsible for apprehension costs, particularly after the breach has occurred. This indemnitor 
is often the criminal defendant himself or it may be a family who does not want to see the criminal 
defendant returned to custody. Further, this indemnitor had a choice whether to engage the 
services of a bail agent and which bail agent to usc. Aladdin requires indemnitors to agree that if 
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there is a breach of the bail agreement, the indemnitor will be contractually liable to pay actual 
and reasonable apprehension expenses incurred in returning the defendant - now a criminal 
fugitive - to custody as a remedy for that breach. The more important policy consideration is 
returning the criminal fugitive to custody which is accomplished by upholding the terms of 
Aladdin's Indemnity Agreement. 
However, even the DOl's two hypothetical circumstances do not present significant risk 
for the bail bond consumer. With respect to the first circumstance, Aladdin and other bail agents 
should as a matter of sound business practice attempt to utilize the least intrusive investigative 
tactics to secure the surrender of the defendant, including contacting the indemnitor and 
requesting his assistance in convincing the defendant to self-surrender. As noted above, 
consumers can contest unreasonable or excessive fees. The second circumstance identified by the 
001 is addressed by Idaho Code § 41-1043 which limits an indemnitor's liability for the forfeiture 
and apprehension costs. 
Finally, the DOL expresses concern over the fact that family and friends are sometimes 
involved in the bail process and are desirous of obtaining the release of the defendant and that 
these transactions sometimes take place outside of normal business hours. A.R. 114 (Final Order, 
p. 6). As set forth above, the overriding policy consideration notwithstanding the possible 
involvement of family in obtaining the bond should be the return of an absconding criminal 
defendant to custody. Further, most significant bonds are not posted at night. The typical bond 
for a felony is determined by a judge during the day and the bail transaction is accomplished 
during business hours. See Idaho Criminal Rules 4, 5 and 46( c). Bonds posted at night are 
generally for misdemeanors pursuant to a set schedule and the penal sum of the bonds for 
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misdemeanors arc generally far less than for felonies. See Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 13. 
Additionally, the DOl acknowledges that it is appropriate for a bail agent to obtain collateral in 
connection with a bail bond and that collateral sometimes includes an indemnitor's home. An 
additional promise to reimburse bail agents for apprehension expenses incurred in the event of a 
breach does not dramatically alter the nature of the transaction. Indeed, as previously discussed, it 
often works to the significant financial advantage of the consumer by providing bail agents a 
financial incentive to return an absconder to court instead of simply letting the forfeiture stand and 
collecting the entire amount of the bond from that indemnitor. 
d. permitting the recovery of apprehension costs is consistent with the 
Legislative history of Idaho Code § 41-1042 
In addition to the plain language ofldaho Code § 41-1042 and its underlying public policy, 
this statute's legislative history establishes that the Idaho Legislature did not intend to preclude 
indemnity agreements permitting the recovery of apprehension costs such as that contained in the 
Third Paragraph. Prior to passing Idaho Code § 41-1042, the House Business Committee was 
aware that this new legislation would mean that a party who pledged collateral in order to obtain a 
bail bond on behalf of another could lose that collateral in the event the bail bond was forfeited. 
The Committee minutes reflect the following: 
Rep. Douglas presented an example of parents pledging title to their home as 
collateral for a bond to bailout their child from jail, and asked whether the parents 
would lose their home if the child skips bail. Mr. Duvall [charter president of the 
Professional Bail Agents of Idaho] said that this would be the case. 
H 62, February 11,2003 House Business Committee Minutes. 7 
7 See http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2003/StandingCommittees/hbusmin. 
html#feb 11. 
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Because the obligation to pay the bail bond only arises upon forfeiture, an agreement to 
pay that forfeiture necessarily arises as part of a separate indemnity agreement. Although Idaho 
Code § 41-1042 does not explicitly permit recovery of a forfeited bond, such recovery is 
permissible because reimbursement for a forfeited bond is not a charge assessed for the bail 
agent's services in connection with the bail transaction. 8 Similarly, although Idaho Code § 41-
1042 does not explicitly permit reimbursement for expenses incurred in apprehending and 
surrendering a criminal defendant, such reimbursement is also permissible pursuant to an 
indemnity agreement. It is nonsensical to interpret Section 41-1042 as permitting bail agents to 
contract through an indemnity agreement for the recovery of a forfeited bond but forbidding bail 
agents from contracting through an indemnity agreement for the recovery of apprehension costs, 
partiCUlarly when the statute is silent as to the types of contingent losses to which collateral may 
be applied. 
e. the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of bail agents' 
recovery of expenses pursuant to an indemnity agreement 
Further, "courts must construe a statute under the assumption that the legislature knew of 
all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed." D & M 
Country Estates Homeowners Ass 'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 165,59 P.3d 965,970 (2002). 
8 Again, the DOl readily acknowledges that the bail agent may recover the forfeited bond 
amount from the indemnitor pursuant to a prior agreement. A.R. 116,119 (Final Order, p. 8, 11); 
Tr. 7-21-2010) p. 15, In. 7 - p. 16, In. 6; see also Tr. p. 24, In. 4-5 (3-8-10) (remarks by counsel 
for DOl acknowledging that "collateral" which the bail agent is permitted to collect during the 
bail transaction is to secure the bail bond); Tr. (3-8-10) p. 20, In. 22-24 (DOl counsel discussing 
loss of collateral posted by third paI1y indemnitor when defendant absconds); Tr. (3-8-10) p. 22, 
In. 1-8 (DOl counsel stating that "the person who put up the collateral to secure that bond" has a 
stake in returning an absconder to court); and Tr. (3-8-10) p. 22, In. 15-25 (DOl counsel arguing 
that collateral is about securing the bond because Section 41-1043 connects collateral to the 
amount of the bond). 
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Courts must assume that the legislature knew of all legal precedent when passing a statute. D & 
M CountfY Estates Homeowners Ass 'n, 138 Idaho at 165,59 P.3d at 970. Idaho Code § 41-1042 
was passed in 2003, years after the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that bail agents may recover 
expenses pursuant to the terms of an indemnity agreement in Martin v. Lyons, 98 Idaho 102, 105, 
558 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1977). 
In Lyons, a third party entered into an indemnity agreement with the bail bond company 
and later disputed its liability under this agreement. ld. The court determined the indemnification 
clause at issue was reasonably read as allowing the bail agents to be indemnified for "voluntary" 
disbursements. ld. The Court reasoned that bail agents can recover consistent with the terms of 
the indemnity agreement. ld. ("[I]fthe indemnification clause agreed to by [the indemnitor] and 
[the bail agents] allows indemnification for payments that are not legally required of the bail 
agents, then [the indemnitor] would be so obligated irrespective of whether the forfeiture of [the 
Principal's] bail was valid or invalid.") Because the legislature knew that the Idaho Supreme 
Court had acknowledged that bail agents could recover voluntary disbursements pursuant to 
indemnity agreements when it passed Idaho Code § 41-1042, and did not state the law should be 
otherwise, it is presumed that such recovery is still allowed. If this was not the case, the 
legislature would have explicitly stated as such. 
f. the DOl's position regarding the recovery of apprehension costs is novel 
and unsupported by authority from other jurisdictions 
The DOl's attempt to limit a bail agent's ability to contract for the recovery of 
apprehension costs in the event of a later breach by a criminal defendant is novel and unsupported 
by authority from other jurisdictions. 
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In Saladino v. Stuyvesant Jns. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), a bail agent 
sought to recover, pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a $4,000 fee paid to a licensed investigator 
to apprehend and surrender the principal to custody. 39 A.D.2d at 765. The principal failed to 
appear at two court dates, thus the bail agent hired an investigator to locate him. Jd. The court 
held that under the broad language of the indemnity agreement, the bail agent was entitled to 
recover expenses incurred in recapturing and surrendering the principal, provided such expenses 
are the fair and reasonable value of services rendered. 9 Jd. However, because the principal was 
residing with his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular employment, 
a $4,000 investigator fee was unreasonable. Jd. As such, the court granted a new trial to 
determine the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered. Jd. The Saladino court 
provided: 
While it may be that large contingent fee retainers are customary 
and are necessary in many cases to obtain effective results, there is 
no apparent reason why a surety should not first mount a more 
modest, superficial investigation such as would have been adequate 
to locate the principal herein. 
Under the broad language of the indemnity agreement executed by 
[third party signor], [the bail agent] is entitled to reimbursement 
for expenses in connection with the apprehension of the principal. 
Jd. (emphasis added). 
In fact, it is a common practice throughout the United States for bail agents to utilize 
indemnity agreements to contract for reimbursement of expenses in the event of a breach by the 
criminal defendant. See, e.g. Hernandez v. USA Bail Bonds, 1999 WL 740441 (Tex. Ct. App. 
9 Similar to Idaho Code § 41-1042, N.Y. Insurance Law § 6804, which sets forth the 
permissible premium or compensation for a bail bond, is silent as to reimbursement pursuant to 
indemnity agreements. 
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1999) (unpublished) (affirming settlement between bail bond company and third party 
indemnitors who "executed contracts to indemnify in which they agreed to act as sureties for [bail 
amount], plus all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in apprehending [principal] in the 
event [prinicipal] forfeited his bond"); Campbell v. A.A.A. Bail Bonds, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1229, 
2008 WL 187968 (Ind. App. 2008) (unpublished) (finding AAA acted as authorized agent when 
executing the indemnity agreement and therefore able to recover under the agreement for costs, 
expenses and fees incurred by AAA in returning defendant to custody); and Calamita v. DePonte, 
122 Conn. 20, 187 A. 129 (1936) (action arising out of indemnity agreement where defendants 
agreed to indemnify bail bond sureties for damages and costs incurred by sureties because of 
accused's default). 
Many states also have codified the foregoing practice. See. e.g. Del. Code Ann. 18, § 
4347 (providing surety insurance contracts for bail bond agents to reimburse the bail agent 
personally, or permit the bail agent to have a right of action against the defendant or any 
indemnitor for actual expenses incurred in good faith, by reason of breach by the defendant of any 
of the terms of the written agreement); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 374.719 (providing bail bond agents with 
the authority to use collateral to reimburse costs in case of failure to appear for reimbursement of 
costs and expenses incurred); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 697.300(5) (providing for reimbursement or right 
of action "against the principal or any indemnitor, for actual expenses incurred in good faith, by 
reason of breach by the defendant of any of the terms of the written agreement under which and 
pursuant to which the undertaking of bailor bail bond was written"); Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 
31A-35-608 (providing bail bond businesses the right to reimbursement for actual expenses 
incurred by the bail bond surety in good faith by reason of breach by the defendant of the bail 
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bond agreement); Ark. Admin. Code 164.00.1-23 (provides bail bond businesses the right to 
deduct from the collateral reasonable expenses incurred due to a breach of the bail bond contract); 
lOCal. Code Reg 10, § 2081 (providing bail licensee the right to reimburse himself for actual, 
reasonable and necessary expenses incurred and caused by a breach by the arrestee of any of the 
terms of the written agreement under which and pursuant to which the undertaking of bailor the 
bail bond was written). 
The undersigned has been unable to locate authority from other jurisdictions which forbid 
a bail agent from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the bail transaction which 
permit recovery of this contingent loss. The DOl's interpretation of an Idaho statute as forbidding 
this is novel and altogether inconsistent with the statutory, regulatory and case laws of other 
jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
The public policy underlying bail bonds and encouraging the return of fugitives to custody, 
existing Idaho case law, the legislative history ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 and overwhelming 
authority from other states all establish that bail agents are entitled to contract for the fair and 
reasonable value of costs incurred in connection with apprehending and surrendering a principal 
to the court's custody. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such costs furthers the public 
policy underlying bail bonds by promoting a criminal defendant's appearance in court. 
4. The DOl's promulgation of a new rule purporting to implement Section 41-
1042 does not change this Court's analysis 
While Aladdin's petition for review was pending before the district court, the DOl 
promulgated a rule adopting the reasoning of its Final Order and purporting to implement Section 
41-1042. See IDAPA 18.01.04.016 (effective 4-7-11) (providing that charges for returning a 
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defendant to custody after a breach of the bail bond contract, must be negotiated separately after 
the bail bond has been effectuated). This new rule is only valid to the extent the DOl's 
interpretation of Section 41-1042, as reflected in its Final Order, is correct. Because Section 41-
1042 does not limit indemnity agreements such as that set forth in Paragraph Three, this Court 
should reverse the DOl's erroneous interpretation of Section 41-1042 irrespective of the foregoing 
rule. 
"It is fundamental that the judiciary has the ultimate responsibility to construe legislative 
language to determine the law." JR. Simp/at Co. v. Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 P.2d 
1206, 1210 (1991), citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also 
Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583,21 P.3d 903, 905 (2001). "This principle extends to 
[this Court's] review of administrative rules, and it is this Court's responsibility to determine the 
validity of .. rule[s]." Mason, 135 Idaho at 583, 21 P.3d at 905. "An administrative rule that is 
inconsistent with a statute that it purports to implement is ineffective to the extent of such 
inconsistency." State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17,22, 13 P.3d 344, 349 (Ct. App. 2000); see also 
Moses v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 118 Idaho 676, 680, 799 P.2d 964,968 (1990) ("This Court will 
not enforce a regulation that is, in effect, a rewriting of the statute"). 
The DOl's new rule purports to interpret and implement Section 41-1042. IDAPA 
18.01.04.016 ("Charges and fees outside the scope of Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, such as 
charges for returning a defendant to custody after a breach of the bail bond contract"). Thus, this 
rule is only valid to the extent it is consistent with the legislature'S intent in enacting Section 41-
1042. Had the 001 promulgated this rule prior to Aladdin's request for a declaratory ruling, 
Aladdin could have challenged the rule's validity in an action for declaratory judgment pursuant 
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to I.e. § 67-5278(1). The inquiry in such an action would have been the same presently presented 
to this Court whether Section 41-1042 precludes bail agents from entering indemnity 
agreements at the time of the bail transaction providing for reimbursement for apprehension 
expenses in the event the defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by failing to appear in court. 
That the DOl promulgated a new rule to implement its interpretation of Section 41-1042 as 
described in the Final Order while this action was pending does not alter this Court's inquiry in 
this appeal. This Court should exercise its ultimate responsibility to construe legislative language 
by determining that Section 41-1042 does not limit indemnity agreements such as that described 
in Paragraph Three. 
C. Substantial Rights of Aladdin Are Pre.judiced By the DOl's Declaratory 
Ruling 
Substantial rights of Aladdin have been prejudiced by the declaratory ruling of the DOL 
See Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced."). The declaratory ruling reflected in the DOl's Final Order was issued in response to 
the request for declaratory ruling sought by Aladdin. AR. 109 (Final Order); AR. 1 (Aladdin's 
request for declaratory ruling). This declaratory ruling specifically concerns the Indemnity 
Agreement for Surety Bail Bond utilized by Aladdin to transact business and forbids Aladdin 
"from entering into indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as 
the Indemnity Agreement, Exhibit A to the December 10,2009, letter request for declaratory 
ruling, contemporaneous with the bail transaction .... " A.R. 109, 121 (Final Order); AR. 11-13 
(Indemnity Agreement). Aladdin is financially harmed by this declaratory ruling which prohibits 
29 
Aladdin from seeking reimbursement of apprehension costs it incurs in apprehending a criminal 
defendant who has failed to appear in court as required pursuant to the terms of its Indemnity 
Agreement executed at the time of the bail transaction. Thus, Aladdin's substantial rights are 
prej udiced by this declaratory ruling. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Final Order because the DOl's 
declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity 
agreement at the time of a bail transaction which permits collection of apprehension costs later 
incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices 
Aladdin's substantial rights. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 2011. 
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